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1.  Introduction 
 
No archives of Vilfredo Pareto exist, to the best of our knowledge, beside the small collections 
kept at the Cantonal University Library of Lausanne and at the National Library of Florence that 
mostly consists of already published writings
1. In the current research, by ‘archives’ we mean 
Pareto’s letters that have so far been published in the collection of his Œuvres Complètes
2. 
 
The elements of theoretical or applied analysis that can be found in the correspondence of an 
economist  of  the  past  are  not  necessarily  negligible.  They  can  consist  of,  for  example, 
introductive  discussions  to  the  theories  (which  can  assist  in  determining  how  the  author’s 
intellectual work actually took shape); first drafts of the theories (from which it is possible to 
gauge the elaboration the theories underwent before reaching publication); and free comments on 
the reactions triggered by the theories. In Pareto’s case, we are integrating these elements with 
the analytical elements that are present in his volumes and articles, as well as with the relevant 
part of the vast secondary bibliography and with the history of the events and ideas of his time. 
These  elements  have  been  detailed  in  the  Paretian  intellectual  biography  that  we  have  been 
preparing for some years. 
 
Thus,  the  question  needed  to  be  asked  how  we  should  present  the  analysis  of  Pareto’s 
correspondence, which includes nearly 5,000 letters, in a sufficiently interesting way for those 
economic historians who are not scholars of his work. As a solution, we have chosen to divide the 
results  according  to  three  themes:  Pareto’s  conceptions  of  science,  economic  theory,  and 
economic politics. We have also tried to indicate the connections among these themes and to 
develop  them  in  chronological  order—unless  this  approach  was  threatening  to  obscure  their 
logical reconstruction, in which case we have followed the latter criterion. 
 
2. Elements of Pareto’s conception of science 
 
As is known, the studies on Pareto’s epistemology are still in their infancy. This is probably 
because  today’s  epistemological  schemes  are  ill  suited  to  the  quite  different  and  temporally 
remote epistemological conceptions—that also have to be reconstructed—on which Pareto was 
drawing.  In  addition,  the  elements  that  Pareto  himself  provides  about  his  epistemology  are 
scattered in his chaotic and monumental scientific production, although they can be found in his 
correspondence.  
 
2.1 Delimitation of scientific activity 
   2 
Traces of Pareto’s critical reflection on the characteristics of scientific activity can already be 
found in his earlier letters, where his thought is inspired by the study, for example, of John Stuart 
Mill’s System of Logic (that in 1874 he read in its 1866 French translation)
3; of Buckle’s History 
of English Civilization (probably read in its 1865 French translation)
4; and of The principles of 
psychology by Spencer (probably read in its 1874 French translation)
5. 
 
Pareto  believes  that  all  that  can  be  known  are  the  phenomena,  which  he  sees  as  “facts  and 
relationships of facts”
6. With regard to these phenomena, he believes that by following the crucial 
example given by the natural sciences, one can only determine “how they happen, and not why”
7. 
All this leads Pareto to proclaim himself “the most positivist of positivists”
8. It should thus be 
noted that he will always regard as self-evident the notion of “facts”. Therefore, he will never see 
the  deriving  distinctions  between  the  agent  that  studies  and  the  reality  that  is  studied  as 
problematic. Nor does he see as problematic the distinctions between the study of subjective 
phenomena, which he understands as those “that take place in the minds” of people, and the study 
of objective phenomena—that is those “that take place outside” human minds
9. 
 
One should also take into account that there exist two categories of phenomenal relationships. If 
fact A acts on fact B and fact B does not act on fact A, “one can, if one wishes, call A the cause 
and B the effect”. If fact A acts on fact B and fact B reacts on fact A, instead of a relationship of 
cause and effect there is a relationship of interdependence, as can very frequently be observed in 
the economic and sociological phenomena of a continuous kind
10. Interdependence (a concept 
that Pareto borrows from Spencer
11) can only be dealt with through mathematical logic
12. 
 
Pareto  also  thinks  that  phenomenal  (alias  experimental,  alias  scientific)  knowledge  is  only 
relative
13, in the sense that every proposition it arrives at (including pure logic propositions) is 
only valid “within the space and time limits that are known to us”
14. His research programme, 
partly realized through his Trattato di sociologia, therefore also presented to the social sciences 
the concept of relativity that was gradually introduced in the natural sciences by Galileo and 
Copernicus, and later followed by Newton, Poincaré and finally Einstein
15. 
 
According to Pareto, since the human mind is “always the same”, the knowledge of the history of 
natural sciences is extremely useful for the purpose of  scientific studies. This is because by 
showing us the ways (at all times inevitably similar) in which the sciences have developed in the 
past,  it  lets  us  know  how  the  new  sciences  will  develop
16—though  generally  through  an 
increasingly minute (and inevitably arbitrary) subdivision of their topics
17. Furthermore, such a 
history also shows that observation and theory alternate at the forefront of scientific development, 
as is necessary because “observation without theory is empiricism”, whereas “theory without 
observation runs the risk of being mere imagination”
18. 
 
Finally,  with  regard  to  science,  Pareto  opposes  metaphysics,  which  he  always  criticizes  in 
disparaging terms
19, and which he envisages as going from the name to the thing that the name 
designates. In metaphysical arguments, a thing consists of a “nebula of sentiments”—such as 
“good,  evil,  the  beautiful,  right,  wrong”—which  have  never  been  able  to  be  defined,  and, 
consequently,  the  discussions  on  such  confusing  topics  have  no  resolving  criteria  and  are 
therefore fatally inconsistent
20. 
   3 
2.2 Modalities for carrying out scientific activity 
 
As just mentioned, it is language that allows an explanation of the phenomena investigated. Thus, 
only those expressions that correspond “in a rigorous and precise way to some real objects” can 
be used
21. This refrains from the belief that words are “the things themselves” and not merely 
some  signs  of  them
22—insignificant  in  themselves
23.  Natural  sciences  are  the  “only  sciences 
worthy of such a name” precisely because they are the only sciences that have been able to 
connect facts, whereas the self-styled moral sciences only connect ideas
24. In the absence of such 
a correspondence between facts and ideas, one can only admit postulates, but with the condition 




Scientific investigation can be carried out in two ways. Through mathematics,  formal errors of 
reasoning are avoided. The other, the experimental method, is the method of the natural sciences, 
which is different from the empirical method because it studies all the known elements of the 
phenomena and is not satisfied with investigating them all together
26. This allows the grounding 
of the scientific propositions in those “positive and real” premises, without which they would end 
up meandering in the realm of metaphysics
27. More precisely, while mathematics is a type of 
logic drawn from experience, which makes it possible “to undertake lines of reasoning that are 
too long and complex”
28 to be developed verbally, the experimental method is the method that 
goes from things to names
29. In actual terms, this method, which is even more powerful than self-
observation
30, consists in directly observing “the facts”
31—that is, the real entities, people and 
things—that have an infinite number of properties that science cannot but study separately
32 and 
through successive approximations
33. On the one hand, this implies that it will not be possible to 
have the complete theory of any phenomenon but only the causes that give its “main part”
34. On 
the other hand, for the purpose of the positive or normative application of scientific results to 
reality, it will be necessary to take them all into consideration—that is, it will be necessary to 
make a synthesis of them
35. 
 
Pareto will never accept any approach that sees the recourse to mathematics as an alternative to 
the  experimental  method.  Moreover,  if  the  case  arose,  he  would  not  hesitate  to  abandon 
mathematics altogether “because in all physical sciences the experimental method is sovereign”
36. 
 
Scientific work arrives at identifying natural laws, that Pareto ended up thinking of as simple 
uniformities, of the kind phenomenon A accompanies phenomenon B, and, as such, devoid of 
any aspect of necessity
37, which at first Pareto also had assigned to them
38. Therefore, in order to 
explain a fact one needs to show that it accompanies other facts
39. In this sense, the experimental 




Finally, the scientific propositions into which scientific laws are formally expressed are of two 
kinds: descriptive (“oxygen is a gaseous body”) and hypothetical (“if oxygen is combined with 




   4 
2.3 Scientific truth 
 
Since  his  youth,  Pareto  believed  that  the  truth  of  a  doctrine  depends  only  on  its  intrinsic 
characteristics and never on the number of its supporters, since it has been amply demonstrated 
that no error has ever existed that has not found a majority of supporters
42. 
 
Later, he places the term ‘truth’ among those that are obscure to him. He manages to define it—
obviously  only  within  experimental  knowledge—as  the  coincidence  between  the  two  only 
existing “orders of phenomena”: the interior (i.e. psychological) order and the exterior order
43. 
More precisely, truth is only “an agreement between experience and thought”
44. 
 
At first, Pareto deems an interesting test of the truth of a doctrine to be the number of critical 
arguments that the doctrine has succeeded in rebutting
45. However, he later realizes that such a 
method  is  erroneous  because  it  is  possible  to  oppose  refutable  arguments  to  a  theory  that, 
contrary to our impressions, is false
46. This observation will lead him to be generally satisfied 




3.  Pareto’s  conception  of  economic  theory:  methodology,  contents  and 
limitations 
 
It is in Pareto’s conception of science—of which we have reconstructed the elements that are 
present in his correspondence—that his approach to economic theory must be placed. 
 
The first important reference Pareto makes to economic theory is found at the end of 1888. He 
regrets not having yet carried out his project to write a treatise on “rational political economy”, 
which, following the example of rational mechanics treatises, he envisages as the clearest and 
most concise possible exposition, feasible only through mathematics
48, of the “general principles 
of economic science in their most general aspects”
49. The first book he quotes as coming close to 




However, on the eve of Pareto’s professional approach to political economy two year later, it 
seems to him that the elements that he considers to be the fundamental variables of an economic 
system  (population,  taxes,  public  debt,  foreign  trade  etc)  can  be  correctly  evaluated  only  in 
relation to the trend of the system’s wealth, even though the available statistical data are still very 
imperfect
51.  He  consequently  deems  Pantaleoni’s  book,  Dell’ammontare  probabile  della 
ricchezza in Italia, “the best study of political economy that has been published in Italy in many 
years”. Moreover, he will base the investigations he is thinking of doing on the Italian economy 
on this work
52. He also greatly appreciates Pantaleoni’s article “Indice della variazione dei prezzi 
di importazione e di esportazione in Italia dal 1878 al 1889” (Giornale degli Economisti, May 
1891) because he believes that “by following this path that it will be possible to make political 
and  economic  progress”.  Furthermore,  the  growing  wealth  of  economic  knowledge  of  an 
empirical kind makes one hope that it will be possible to emulate Kepler, who availed himself of 
very precise observations and was finally able to calculate the orbit of Mars
53. On the other hand, 
in the current state of affairs, he believes that pure political economy falls within the realm of   5 
metaphysics
54. As Auspitz and Lieben’s self-styled demonstration shows, a country (Germany) 
obtains  profits  through  protectionism,  whilst  “protection  is  a  folly  and  a  fraud  ...  an  anti-
economic regime” whose evils are unquestionable
55. 
 
3.1 The theory of exchange  
 
The starting point of Pareto’s economic theory  studies is his reading (that took place in the 
summer of 1891) of Pantaleoni’s Principi di economia pura
56. In line with his aforementioned 
experimental conception of science, it seems to Pareto that its main topic—that is the theory of 
exchange—should set off from the “naked” fact that, for a quantity of good, everyone is prepared 
to pay what they reckon is its market price. Furthermore, they believe they have got a good deal 
if they pay a lower price, and a bad deal if they pay a higher price. They react to a possible 
increase by necessarily saving on other goods even though they choose them at random and not 
because of their lower degree of utility
57. 
 
Continuing in his analysis of hedonistic political economy, Pareto believes that the explanation it 
gives through the homo economicus hypothesis inevitably captures only one part of the reality (as 
the case of the infinite number of reasons for exchange indicates) because such a hypothesis 
implies that the trader is not only an egocentric, but also someone who acts on the basis of 
reasoning alone, or, above all, on the basis of habit, as demonstrated by experience. On the other 
hand, even if homo economicus were “very close to real man”, this would not guarantee that 
hedonistic  economics  would  achieve  results  “very  close  to  the  real  ones”  because  a  small 
difference in the causes can produce a very great difference in the effects
58. 
 
Pareto’s  first  critical  conclusion  with  regard  to  economic  theory  is  therefore  that  hedonistic 
economics must proceed cautiously, always starting from experience and always being open to 
theoretical extensions, as was the case for theoretical mechanics
59. 
 
Pareto quickly realizes that the final degrees of utility of goods (not their total utilities, of which 
an individual is never aware) actually govern exchanges
60. However, he is left with the crucial 
doubt of not knowing how to measure them: a doubt which had originally led him to think of 
starting  his  study  of  exchange  from  the  better known  curves  of  supply  and  demand
61.  More 
specifically,  Pareto  cannot  accept  the  hypothesis  of  continuity  of  consumption,  since  it  is 
disproved by the common experience of consumers
62. Nor can he accept the hypothesis of the 
coincidence of the final degree with the last quantity consumed, since it is disproved by the case 
of short-term speculators, who do not consume, but whose activity is decisive in the formation of 
the prices
63. The generality of the hypothesis of the decreasing of the final degree of utility is also 
unacceptable,  since  it  is  disproved  by  various  empirical  counter-examples
64.  Furthermore, 
maximum pleasure, which is another fundamental concept of hedonistic economics, is a situation 
that traders do actually achieve, but without being able to predetermine it. The consequence is 
such that the exchanges are likely to oscillate around the point of maximum pleasure. He believes 
that this is a trend that must be demonstrated anyway, thus necessarily paving the way to a new, 
dynamic branch of hedonistic economics
65. 
 
Pareto takes all these cautions into account and critically analyses the two available conceptions 
of the final degree of utility. According to the first and very general conception, the final degree   6 
of utility depends on all the circumstances affecting it, which, by leaving the final degrees of 
utility “entirely undetermined”, renders “the fundamental theorem” of the proportionality of the 
prices  to  the  degrees  heuristically  sterile
66.  If  one  accepts  instead  Wicksteed’s  conception, 
according  to  which  the  final  degree  is  defined,  once  a  consumer  and  a  good  are  given,  the 
aforementioned theorem increases our knowledge. This is even though one is not able to measure 
the final degrees, and even though, as it happens on the stock exchange, for example, share prices 
depend also on their variation in time
67. 
 
Thus, Pareto ends up accepting hedonistic economics, although only provisionally, as long as one 
is  prepared  to  admit  that  its  fundamental  hypothesis  of  a  continuous  and  always  decreasing 
degree  of  utility  is  susceptible  to  empirical  refutations
68.  If  one  accepts  this  hypothesis, 
mathematical economics, and only mathematical economics, is able to demonstrate
69 that the 
demand for a good is a decreasing function of the price, whereas when the price rises, the supply 
starts by increasing and then decreasing
70. 
 
At any rate, since, according to Pareto, the economic problem continues to lie in the assessment 
of how a provision affects people’s welfare, its solution entails the need to measure that welfare. 
Finally, since it has not been demonstrated that this welfare “is a quantity”
71, Pareto believes that 
the difficulty can be avoided
72 by making use of an index that “clearly” distinguishes a greater 
welfare from a lesser one
73. 
 
While only admitting this idea as a postulate, Pareto has indeed no doubt that every human being, 
when put in front of two states of welfare (each deriving from a different combination of goods), 
is able to say whether he deems them equal, or one greater than the other
74. Without worrying 
about the reasons behind the received answer
75, this makes it possible to trace the lines of equal 
welfare (or of equal pleasure)
76; that is, the “lines of indifference”
77 (that Pareto generally shows 
with  a  negative  incline,  but  also  illustrating  the  situation  that  will  be  later  defined  of 
lexicographical arrangement
78). Pareto ascribes this concept to Edgeworth—although he stresses 
that the latter derives it from the hypothesis of the final degree of utility—whereas in Pareto’s 




According  to  Pareto,  the  analytical  evolution  that  leads  him  from  the  final  degree  of  utility 
(redefined ‘ophelimity’ in his Cours d’économie politique) to the index of ophelimity in the 
Manuale  di  economia  politica,  and  finally  to  the  index-function  of  the  Manuel  d’économie 
politique—which only indicates “in which direction the individual will move”—constitutes  a 




3.2. General economic equilibrium 
 
It is interesting to note that, though Pareto does not follow “all the publications of mathematical 
journals”
81, at the beginning of the century, he thinks that mathematics, “with the reason, or the 
pretext, of rigour”, is by now only searching for fine points. At any rate, for its applications, 
which  include  political  economy,  “the  ancient  science”—as  exemplified  by  the  first  three 
volumes of Jules Houël’s Cours de calcul infinitesimal, published in Paris by Gauthiers-Villars in   7 
1878–1881, and by the seven volumes of Hermann Laurent’s Traité d’analyse, published in Paris 
by Gauthiers-Villars in 1885–1891—is still “always exclusively” sufficient
82. On the other hand, 
in  an  economist’s  training,  the  study  of  mathematics  is  of  secondary  importance;  what  is 
necessary is “to study social sciences as one studies natural sciences”, and in order to do so, one 
must  rid  oneself  “of  metaphysics,  of  sentiment”  and  follow  experience  as  the  only  guide
83. 
Furthermore, mathematical economics, based on the aforementioned mathematical foundations, 
deals with matters that are quite different from the laws of supply and demand
84. 
 
Generally speaking, mathematical analysis is of little use in political economy if it is applied to 
specific, numerical problems, such as the calculation of single prices or the study of the final 
degree of utility
85. It is, instead, of great use if it is applied to general, qualitative problems, such 
as, mainly, the identification of the conditions determining general economic equilibrium (GEE), 
which allows the expression of the “interdependence” of the economic phenomena
86 through the 
concept  of  equilibrium  (initially  considered  by  Pareto  as  “a  fact”
87,  and  later  simply  as  an 
analytically useful abstraction
88). In fact, the use of mathematics in political economy is only 
justified for the purpose of solving the problem of GEE
89, from which it is wrong to think of 
drawing practical applications
90, which implies that there will probably never be the need “to 
solve any economic equation numerically”
91. 
 
It is by following the experimental methodology outlined above, and in particular its suggestion 
that there is no single cause to social and economic phenomena, but they are interdependent
92, 
that Pareto arrives at choosing GEE. Auspitz and Lieben’s analyses of partial equilibrium, like 
those  by  Launhardt  and  Cournot,  do  not  take  into  account  either  the  reductions  and  the 
suppressions  of  consumption  induced  by  customs  duties,  or  the  fact  that  often  the  protected 
companies earn much less than the customs authority. On the contrary, Walras’ GEE succeeds in 
accounting for these complications of international trade
93, though without matching the clarity 
and  accuracy  of  exposition  of  Cairnes’  theory  of  international  commerce
94,  which  Pareto 
somehow wishes to update with his article “Teoria matematica del commercio internazionale” 
(Giornale  degli  Economisti,  April  1895)  that  indeed  shows  a  theory  of  international  trade 
reformulated “with Walras’ formulae”
95. 
 
By  putting  together  exchange  and  production,  GEE  gives  an  overall,  albeit  inevitably 
approximate, representation of the economic phenomenon and will be defined by Pareto as the 
problem of identifying “what the actions of the people will be”, “given the tastes that people have 
and the obstacles they encounter in order to satisfy them”
96. Moreover, the question of GEE 
consists  in  studying  the  way  in  which  economic  goods  are  distributed  in  a  community  of 
individuals who are “entirely similar”—not only from a physiological point of view, but also in 
terms of their income and the quantities they own. GEE is based on the solution of the problem of 
the choices made by one single individual, which is a problem that in the end can be reformulated 
without making use “either of ophelimity, or even of prices”
97 because they “are a result of the 
position of equilibrium and do not determine it”
98). Therefore, as far as theory is concerned, “it 
would be better always to discuss one single individual”, leaving the study of GEE for social 
classes to the practical applications of the theory
99. 
 
In this way, the theory of free competition—that is, the case of constant prices—is only a part of 
the theory of GEE, and it allows one also to consider variable manufacture coefficients and   8 
prices
100.  That  which  gives  “the  conditions  for  mechanical  equilibrium  and  for  economic 
equilibrium (which is similar to the former), as it does in general for all kinds of equilibria”
101 is 
the  equation  of  virtual  velocities.  And  the  representation  of  GEE  given  in  the  Manuale  di 




In 1907, while somehow taking stock of his investigations on GEE, Pareto deems the study of 
static GEE as still being in its infancy. This is despite the fact that it is “much less difficult” than 
dynamic GEE
103, the study of which one will only be able to start after finding out “what relation 
exists, in economics, between force and acceleration”
104. The progress of static GEE depends, 
instead, on the ability to solve its system of equations, or at least to study the properties of the 
solution  for  particular  forms  of  the  ophelimity  function;  for  instance  ϕ(x)=A/x
α  or 
ϕ(x)=A0+A1x+A2x
2+…. where the conditions ϕx>0, ϕxx<0, ϕxxx>0 are satisfied
105. 
 
An important development of Pareto’s GEE is the economy of welfare. It is interesting to note 
that,  at  first,  the  principle  of  the  incomparability  of  the  final  degrees  of  utility,  on  which 
Pantaleoni  insists  so  much,  does  not  make  an  impression  on  Pareto.  Indeed,  like  all  other 
sciences, the science of economics is a science of averages. It is therefore crucial, for hedonistic 
economics, to find an average final degree of utility. This can be calculated if the demand is 
known
106,  since  the  demand  for  a  good  is  a  function  of  the  final  degrees  of  utility  of  its 
consumers—possibly  starting  from  the  family  budgets  of  Le  Play’s  school
107.  However,  this 
research programme is soon abandoned in favour of the one that will lead to the well-known, 
innovative definition by Pareto of economic optimum. 
 
Pareto has never been in any doubt that the total ophelimities of the individuals 1,2,3…Φ1, Φ2, Φ3 
… are heterogeneous and therefore cannot be added up. If one varies the quantities of goods 
consumed by the individuals, it will be possible to group the ensuing variations dΦ1, dΦ2, dΦ3 … 
in two cases. In the first case, some of them are positive and some are negative (which is, in other 
words, the situation from which it is not possible to move while at the same time benefiting all 
the members of the community
108). In the second case, they are all positive or all negative. It is 
“only in order to give a name to the first case” that Pareto called it “maximum of ophelimity”, 
and  the  continuation  of  his  analysis  consisted  only  in  finding  the  quantities  of  goods 
corresponding to that maximum. He solved the problem by dividing every variation of individual 
total ophelimity by the individual marginal ophelimity of a single good (good x, for instance) 
φ1x,φ2x,φ3x … In this way he obtained the individually consumed quantities of x, dΦ1/φ1x, dΦ2/φ2x, 
dΦ3/φ3x …, which are homogeneous quantities and can therefore be added up
109. 
 
3.3 Pareto’s criticism of other economists 
 
The  rigorous  consideration  of  the  economic  phenomenon  in  terms  of  GEE  is  also  the 
characteristic that, according to Pareto, distinguishes “the new theories from the ancient ones”
110. 
Goods  and  labour  prices,  the  interest  rate,  and  the  rents  of  the  various  capitals  are  indeed 
unknown  facts  that  are  simultaneously  determined  by  a  system  of  equations  in  which  some 
parameters  also  appear:  one  can  therefore  say  that  the  facts  are  determined  by  all  such 
parameters
111. Non-mathematical economists, instead, were and still are looking for the parameter 
that determines the single unknown fact, which does not make sense
112: the demonstration of the   9 
cognitive error of literary economics is, according to Pareto, one of the most important results of 
the application of mathematical economics
113. The main difference between Pareto’s economics 
and Austrian economics lies precisely in the fact that the latter still admits a cause for value. 
Pareto does not agree with this, for the very reason that the exchange value one observes on the 
market depends “on all the economic circumstances of barter, production, and capitalisation”
114. 
 
On the other hand, the distinction between economic schools must not be based on the use of 
mathematics (the knowledge of which is necessary but not sufficient in order to write about 
mathematical  economics
115),  but  on  the  “more  or  less  extensive  [use]  of  the  experimental 
method”
116. As a consequence, Pareto feels as distant from Walras as he does from Edgeworth 
and Marshall (of whom he notes the inability to “get an idea of economic equilibrium”
117, while 
always  giving  incomplete  solutions  of  the  economic  problem
118).  Although  making  use  of 
mathematics, the latter two consider economics as “an art mixed with metaphysics, that leads 
towards  the  ideal  they  have  set  themselves”
119.  According  to  Pareto,  however,  the  scientific 




Initially, Pareto had credited the three abovementioned economists, together with Gustave de 
Molinari  (though  disagreeing  with  the  latter’s  dislike  for  pure  economy)
121,  with  being  his 
teachers
122.  The  reconstruction  of  Pareto’s  relationship  with  Walras,  as  shown  by  his 
correspondence, is quite interesting. We do not know when, but Pareto’s first reading of the 
Elements d’économie politique pure
123 had been interrupted because of the disgust caused to him 
by its “metaphysical part, which is so large in it”. Pareto’s subsequent reading of Pantaleoni’s 
Principi had instead indicated to him that in Walras’ work “there was  something other than 
metaphysics”,  thus  prompting  him  to  read  the  Elements  again  and  to  find  in  them  “a  very 
important theory, namely the theory of economic equilibrium”
124. 
 
Once he has learnt about Walras’ pure economy, judging that for the moment there is little to add 
to it, Pareto decides to do some applications of it, both to convince the public of the utility of the 
mathematical  method  in  economics,  and  to  pave  the  way  for  further  developments  of  pure 
economy itself
125. One of the applications is the clarification that Walras’ proposition, according 
to which it is necessary to take into account the utility of all the goods, implies that the final 
degree of utility of money cannot be considered as constant, since it varies when the price of any 
one good varies and when the available goods vary
126. Pareto also believes that Walras gives little 
importance to the question of the raretés moyennes, even though in his own monetary theory 
there is a rareté moyenne of gold
127. Finally, the “perfect competition”, as discussed by Walras, 
seems  to  Pareto  to  be  just  an  extreme  case  that  does  not  prevent  one  from  taking  into 
consideration, as suggested by Edgeworth, “the obstacles to competition”, thus giving rise to the 
study of the “imperfection of competition”
128. 
 
On the other hand, Pareto immediately finds a point on which he disagrees with Walras: as a 
staunch supporter of the experimental method, contrary to his interlocutor, Pareto will never 
hesitate to modify or abandon a theory if it does not agree with experience
129. 
 
And, with their personal proximity in Lausanne, it quite quickly emerges that Pareto and Walras 
are scientifically poles apart
130, since Pareto limits himself to study “that which is”, refusing to   10 
study, as his predecessor, “that which should be”
131. More precisely, Pareto believes that, even in 
discussing  social  and  moral  sciences,  one  must  clearly  distinguish  the  postulates  from  their 
consequences and from the facts of experience. Walras, instead, does not linger on his postulates, 
which many would not accept, or even leaves them unexpressed, while dwelling at length on 
demonstrations that are “extremely easy as soon as the postulates are accepted”
132—in particular, 
the postulate of the positive effects, in social terms, of a wider role for the State
133. By refusing to 
follow Walras “in his metaphysical ramblings”, Pareto ended up by making an enemy of him
134. 
 
The only point they have in common remains therefore “a rather secondary question for social 
sciences”
135, such as the representation of GEE through mathematical formulae
136 for the case of 
free competition alone
137. Pareto could have represented GEE in a different form from Walras’, 
but he gave it up in order fully to acknowledge Walras’ merit in clarifying to him the concept of 
GEE
138, to which he just added the “idea of successive approximations”, in order to eliminate “the 




3.4 Relation between political economy and sociology 
 
As mentioned above, Pareto feels that, all things considered, political economy is showing little 
progress. He thinks that this is mostly due to the circumstance that, even though the GEE theory 
is a  special case of the theory of  social  equilibrium
140, political economy does not take into 
account the connections between the economic and the social phenomenon
141. 
 
Once one has differentiated between logical actions (i.e. those that directly depend on logic
142) 
and non-logical actions (i.e. those that depend on sentiments
143 and are, for most people, much 
more numerous than the former)
144, social science or sociology should move on and classify the 
heterogeneous forces that affect people’s will into categories (sentiments of sensual pleasure, 
moral  sentiments,  sentiments  of  justice,  religious  sentiments,  without  speculating  what  these 
sentiments are, or, as Spencer does, from where they come), and find out the resultant of each of 
those categories. Such a work of synthesis of facts is very difficult, but Pareto wants to try to 
accomplish it, since he rejects the easy alternative of adopting a metaphysical system
145. 
 
Social science will consist of two parts
146. The first part will be a rational ethics that can only be 
built from postulates, from which precepts must be drawn for human actions: it is a discipline 
Pareto is not interested in, not because he despises it, but because no fundamental postulates exist 
for it, and he is not able to determine them
147. The second part, which is the part Pareto studies, 
will consist in the description of the manifestations of the social activity of the people and in the 
identification of the social variations corresponding to the psychological variations—that is, the 
variations of the moral and religious states—of the individuals. 
 
Since the times of his liberalist campaign, which will be discussed below, Pareto had guessed that 
concrete economic phenomena could only be understood by combining their study with the study 
of the other social phenomena
148. He would have started such a combined study of economics and 
sociology much earlier, if he had earlier understood, also in practical terms, that experimental 
study must only be founded on principles that are “given by experience”. This approach was   11 
precluded to him by his “blind” acceptance of “some ethical principles” that were present in the 
society in which he lived
149. 
 
4. Pareto’s conception of economic politics: positive and militant aspects 
 
It  seems  to  us  that  Pareto’s  entire  theoretical-economic  thought  is  largely  directed  to  the 
clarification of the political phenomenon in general, and of the political-economic phenomenon 
in particular, not only with positive goals, but also, at least for a certain period, with militant 
motivations. We thought therefore that it would be of some interest to gather all the materials on 
his political-economic thought that have been extracted from his correspondence, under the topics 
of Pareto’s liberalist militancy and his conceptions of liberalism, socialism and the problems of 
practical economic policies. 
 
4.1 The course of Pareto’s liberalist militancy 
 
At least until his Cours, Pareto’s theoretical thought is certainly directed towards supporting his 
liberalist militancy, which is founded on his early, profound and vivid adhesion to the general 
principles of liberalism. 
 
Indeed, already in the first documents that record his thought, Pareto—who will later attribute 
this attitude to sentiments innate to him
150—supports all individual liberties, including freedom of 
conscience. However, he stresses that they are often misinterpreted, in the sense that they are 
defended by individuals who only invoke them for themselves, ignoring the fact that partial 
freedom  is  indistinguishable  from  oppression
151.  This  observation  leads  him  apodictically  to 
affirm that to be liberal means to be on the side of the oppressed against the oppressor, whoever 
either of them may be
152. 
 
In an early exemplification of this concept of freedom, Pareto states that he has no doubt about 
“the justice and utility of freedom of trade”
153, pointing out that in the relation between “capital 
and labour” there are only two ways of organizing things. If the State wishes to regulate the price 
of work, then it gives the workers the right to demand that it also regulate the price of the goods 
they buy, which leads to socialism. On the contrary, one has the system of freedom if the State 
leaves the citizens free to deal with each other: this situation includes the freedom of trade union 
association, without which the workers would have their wages imposed to them
154. 
 
The first liberalist economist called upon by Pareto is Francesco Ferrara, author of the important 
article “Il germanesimo economico in Italia” (Nuova Antologia, August 1894), that Pareto deems 
well written, although he is not impressed by the harsh tones Ferrara uses against his opponents. 
Such tones are even less justifiable, given the role that, as Minister of Finance, in 1868 Ferrara 
had in introducing the tax on milling, which was illiberal, since it was not proportional
155. 
 
Similarly,  and  in  the  same  period,  the  conservative  character  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of 
economic freedom put forward by the Florentine jurist Odoardo Luchini gives rise in Pareto to 
the temptation, which he says was swiftly and forever conquered, to cross to the side of the 
socialists of the German Historical School
156. 
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And, after having frequented the fundamental Florentine group of the historic right for ten years, 
Pareto ends up by realizing that his coherently intransigent conception of liberalism
157 is by now 
only followed by a small and combative opposition party—the radical party—with which he 
sympathizes from the mid 1880s
158. He only sees it as a lesser evil
159, though, within a strategy of 
“compromising on the means” in order only and always to pursue the aim “of having minimal 
government action, of getting away from the clutches of the people who bleed the country dry”
160. 
 
Thus,  he  fights  the  customs  duties  imposed  by  Crispi  in  1888  from  the  very  time  they  are 
proposed
161. He does this in a fashion that he acknowledges as being “passionate” but fair, since 
such a new customs policy consists in the appropriation, by the agrarians and the government, of 
other people’s property, in particular the property of poor citizens
162. Pareto intends to quantify
163 
the extent of this appropriation on the basis of the conviction that the custom duties are wholly 
transferred onto the national price, allowing the national producers to collect a sort of private levy 
equal to the customs duties multiplied by the national production
164. Consequently, in the summer 
of  1891,  he  goes  to  Geneva  and  Lausanne,  not  only,  and  not  so  much,  to  meet  Walras  in 
person
165, but also in order to study the Swiss tax system, in an unfinished attempt to carry out an 
international comparison of the weight of taxes and customs protectionism
166. 
 
Pareto shares the thesis of the leader of French liberalism, Gustave de Molinari, that the best the 
liberals can do is to give all social classes the political and economic education they lack, which 
is  the  source  of  “nearly  all  the  evils  of  society”
167.  However,  Pareto  criticizes  the  liberal 
economists (whom in this period he regards as the economists tout court) because he considers 
them “too bland to the powers that be, too lavish of excuses for the monopolies, too uncaring of 
the people’s good”
168, whereas he wishes to invoke the theorems of classic political economy 
precisely “against the oppression by the upper classes”
169. In Pareto’s intentions, the course of 
political  economy  that  he  conducts  in  Lausanne  from  the  summer  semester  1893—which 
includes  one  semester  of  pure  economics  and  three  semesters  of  applied  economics
170—is 
therefore  initially  meant  to  be  the  exposition  (without  recourse  to  mathematics
171)  of  the 




At any rate, Pareto acknowledges that the liberalists find themselves in the awkward position of 
attacking the interests of the small, but aggressive protectionist minority, while defending the 
interests of a majority who, through ignorance, is unappreciative to them of such battles
173, which 
will lead to the victory of economic freedom only in a still distant future
174. 
 
And at the end of the century, together with the bitter realization of the unstoppable decadence of 
the liberals’—and particularly of the liberalists’
175—influence, Pareto acquires the conviction that 
his liberalist campaign has been perfectly useless
176, considering that he has finally realized the 
primordial fact that “man is an evil beast” for his vices, his ignorance, and his prejudices), and 
that he will continue to be so for centuries to come
177. Such a disenchanted attitude towards 
freedom emerges in Pareto in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, which gives him the opportunity to 
observe how the dreyfusards, having won their battle, use the same evil methods against their 
opponents that the French reactionnaries had used against Dreyfus
178. Pareto conceptualises the 
incident in the sense that only a minority, of which he has so far partaken, follow the principles of   13 
liberty, while the majority simply follow their own interests, which is a situation that the liberal 
governments have contributed to create naïvely
179. 
 
From all these considerations Pareto draws the conclusion that, since it is impossible to change 
“the nature and the custom of men”, it is preferable to let them “do, and serenely watch where 
they are going to end up”
180; thus, it is better for him to abandon all participation to active 
political life, in order to devote himself “exclusively to science”
181. In his following reflections on 
his, by now, past liberal militancy, Pareto deals with its lack of effectiveness, which he attributes 
to his not having understood that, in practical activities, knowing is often antithetical to acting. 
This is a subject that is synthesized in Trattato di Sociologia through the thesis of the “distinction 
between the experimental truth of a doctrine and its social utility”
182. 
 
4.2 Theoretical foundations of free trade  
 
Pareto’s  correspondence  gives  ample  indications  about  his  efforts  to  clarify  the  theoretical 
foundations of the liberalism he militantly pursued, with the intuitive argument in favour of free 
trade that is given by the opportunity it affords to procure every product where it costs least
183. 
 
Pareto’s first in-depth reflection refers to a particular characterization of customs protectionism. 
National and international trade can be formally expressed through the ratios a1/b1, a2/b2, a3/b3…, 
where an… is the quantity of products that producer An gives producer Bn in order to obtain the 
quantity  bn…  of  the  latter’s  products.  The  case  of  equal  protection  for  all  economic  agents 
(including those who are not involved in international trade) consists in making all the as and all 
the bs grow in the same proportion, with the consequence that the aforesaid ratios do not change. 
It is debatable whether such a kind of protection (different from the protection known so far, 
which makes only some of the ratios grow) is actually possible; but if it were, it would give the 
same results as free trade, which can be formally expressed precisely by using the series of ratios 
a1/b1, a2/b2, a3/b3…, but also adding the expenses (which constitute a net loss for the country), in 
order to give to, and take from, all the agents the same profit increment
184. From this line of 
reasoning Pareto draws the political suggestion, which he very soon drops, that the most effective 
way to tackle protectionism is to protect all social classes, starting with the workers
185. 
 
In the early 1890s, the main proposition of political economy appears to Pareto to be that not only 
do protective customs duties destroy part of the income of the protected country, but they also 
effect a redistribution of the remaining income. And it is precisely the latter effect that explains 
the persistence of protection. This is because those who are damaged by it, being many, only 
suffer a small individual damage, which they therefore tend to ignore, while the beneficiaries, 
being few, receive great individual advantages, by which they are motivated to be very active in 
trying to achieve them
186. In the case of Pareto’s contemporary Italy, it was precisely in order to 
obtain such advantages that the protectionists (industrialists and landowners) made their members 
of parliament approve the military expenses proposed by the government to meet the terms of the 
Triple Alliance
187. Thus, the truth of the thesis, according to which it is necessary to fight at the 
same time against “war and customs protection”—put forward by the more profound exponents 
of the liberal school, such as Spencer and de Molinari—is proved
188. 
   14 
But,  in  general,  Pareto  only  considers  laissez  faire  as  “the  lesser  possible  evil”  for  today’s 
civilized  peoples.  The  only  demonstration  that  free  traders  must  give
189  is  therefore  that  the 
alternative policies so far applied are worse than laissez faire. Such a system is not required to be 
the best for the peoples of all time and all places
190. It also needs to be considered that if laissez 
faire could be demonstrated, it would not at all entail the willingness by the people to adopt it
191. 
Nevertheless, Pareto devotes himself to the search for this demonstration. At first he simply states 
that the hedonistic maximum is obtained from free competition between capital and labour in the 
production of private goods and services, and from free competition between State and private 
entities in the production of public goods
192. The subsequent study of the variations of welfare for 
the society when production coefficients vary, which materialized in the article “Il massimo di 
utilità dalla libera concorrenza” (Giornale degli Economisti, July 1894), is conducted by Pareto 
because,  even  though  it  is  proved  by  very  many  facts
193,  it  is  by  no  means  evident—as  the 
socialists’ claim that such a welfare can be increased by changing the competition coefficients 
demonstrates—that the coefficients that maximize welfare are actually those obtained “by the 
competitive play of the entrepreneurs”
194. With this article, in agreement with Walras’ opinion, 
Pareto hopes to establish the theory of free trade “on rational bases”
195, and to demonstrate that 
the propositions of pure economics apply to any arrangement, with or without private property
196. 
 
After having specified that he is for economic freedom “as a means to achieve maximum utility 
for the people, and not to favour the wealthy”
197, Pareto does not hesitate anyway to acknowledge 
that  “free  competition  does  not  exist”  yet
198,  whereas  there  exist  “monopolies  of  all  kinds” 
(established by the State




4.3 Pareto and socialism 
 
Throughout his life, Pareto follows the progressive establishment of the socialist movement. His 
evaluation of it is influenced by the early and empirical idea according to which the State’s 
economic  ineptitude  is  demonstrated  by  its  inability  to  “run  well the  industrial  companies  it 
has”
201: an inability that is caused precisely by the absence of those incentives to efficiency and 
innovation that are provided by free competition
202. 
 
Furthermore, after specifying, in strong terms, that liberal economists are as interested in social 
problems  as  the  socialists,  and  that  they  differ from  the  latter  only  because,  contrary  to  the 
socialist approach, they require their solutions to be founded “on experience and logic”
203, Pareto 
thinks, at first, that socialism is “an absurdity” if seen as the doctrine pleading that to each be 
given according to his needs; whereas if it is regarded as the doctrine arguing that to each be 
given according to his merits, it represents the goal that true liberals should pursue
204. In fact, 
popular  socialists  (if  they  convince  themselves  that  the  revolution  is  only  possible  from  a 
situation that is not of extreme poverty) and true liberals could join forces to overturn the current 
bourgeois  socialism—that  is,  the  use  that  the  bourgeoisie  makes  of  the  State  for  its  own 
interests
205. Once they have  succeeded and have therefore temporarily increased the people’s 
welfare, the alliance will dissolve, because the popular socialists will want to use the State to 
their advantage
206. 
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Thus,  Pareto  opposes  socialism  because  he  deems  it  wrong  in  the  economic  part
207,  since, 
following  his  study  of  the  facts
208,  he  does  not  see  how  the  State’s  responsibilities  can  be 
expanded  (as  indeed  required  by  popular  socialists)  without  “considerably”  reducing  the 




However, such a tragic phenomenon would be  a decisive factor in bringing about economic 
freedom,  provided  that  the  bourgeoisie  finally  decides  to  respect  everyone’s  property
210.  In 
general, the owners of fixed and movable capitals have indeed always used them in two ways: the 
first way consists in using them for the production of wealth, and this has always been useful “to 
all men without distinction”; the second way involves using them instead to take possession of 
other people’s riches, and this has always been “harmful to society”
211. If the two uses cannot be 
disentangled, it is likely that it is the  socialists  who are right in demanding the abolition of 
ownership of capital. But if it is possible to prevent the latter use (that is, if it is possible “to 
prevent the rich taking goods from the poor”
212), the main reason for the disastrous socialist 
experiment ceases to exist
213. Consequently, it is also necessary to take into account that, by 
showing that distribution inequality does not vary with time and place, Pareto’s law of income 
distribution  refutes  the  socialists’  claim  that  the  capitalist  system  increases  inequality,  and 
therefore  removes  another  argument  in  support  of  their  proposal  to  change  the  system
214. 
However, from the aforesaid law, Pareto takes, above all, the proposition (which is of a liberal-
radical nature and probably synthesizes his concept of ideal political economy) that a necessary 
and sufficient condition to increase the minimum income and/or reduce the inequality of personal 
incomes is increasing the national income more than the population
215. 
 
4.4 Thoughts on practical economic policies 
 
Finally, from a reading of Pareto’s correspondence one can extract a corpus of general positive 
reflections on the difficulties of practical economic policies. 
 
Even though Pareto does not doubt, in the light of Darwin’s studies, that the fight for existence is 
an “indispensable condition for the betterment of the living races”
216, at first he believes that the 
goal of “every man who is good at heart” is to obtain the good of “most men, and of the most 
deserving ones among them”
217, in the sense of minimizing the sufferings caused by such a fight 
(including Malthusian repressive brakes)
218. Intuitively, the welfare of the people increases when 
the “wealth” produced increases and when the proportion of wealth wasted by the State (mainly 
in armaments) and by the “wealthy” (luxury expenses) decreases
219. Once such wastes have been 
minimized, only poverty will remain. This is caused by reasons such as “a too rapid increase of 
the population, and the vices, weaknesses, physical and moral faults of men”, and these can only 
be remedied by educating the people—a task that can only be accomplished by private citizens
220. 
 
More precisely, however, in order to bring about social good, one has to assess the effects of each 
measure  and,  therefore,  study  them,  irrespective  of  ideological  considerations
221  and  always 
taking into account that the complexity of social phenomena, of which only the direct effects are 
known to us
222, makes it “very difficult” to say whether a single measure will do more harm than 
good
223. 
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In  this  general  picture,  which  is  marked  by  a  profound  scepticism  about  the  possibility  for 
economic politics to be truly scientific, one can still find interesting considerations on various 
aspects of practical economic policies. These seem to Pareto to be characterized by two features. 
Firs  is  the frequent  contrast  made between  the solution  to  the  problem  of  obtaining  popular 
consensus and the solution to the problem of obtaining the “greatest economic advantage”—a 
contrast that the government tries to hide from the public by resorting to arguments that are 
experimentally false (derivations), but make the two solutions look as if they were coinciding
224. 
Second  is  the  fact  that  government  effectiveness  consists  in  “knowing  how  to  make  use  of 
existing sentiments and interests”
225. 
 
With regard to monetary policy, Pareto—who is a committed supporter of gold monometallism
226 
(since bimetallism is a way “to steal from many for the benefit of few”
227)—shares with Walras 
the idea that the function of monetary means can be carried out by gold and silver, provided that 
gold is the metal with the main role. Pareto and Walras part company when Walras proposes that 
the relationship between gold and silver be fixed by the State, because in Pareto’s opinion the 
ways the State has actually used this power have been catastrophic (i.e. inflationary)
228. Similarly, 
Pareto  believes  that  in  order  to  ensure  a  “healthy”  monetary  circulation,  it  is  necessary  and 
sufficient that the State does not violate the private citizens’ freedom to accept or to reject the 
notes, irrespective of whether they are issued by one or more banks
229. 
 
With regard to taxation, Pareto thinks that what matters is not its legal form, but the quantity of 
the revenue
230 that the governments, held back only by the resistance opposed by the taxpayers, 
try to maximize
231 so as to spend it entirely “to pay their friends and to grease the politicians’ 
palm”
232.  Therefore,  no  fair  tax  system  exists
233.  The  best  system  is  that  of  reducing  taxes 
because, since the incentive to work increases  when disposable income increases
234, in many 
countries it is precisely the excessive tax levying that prevents “the betterment of the conditions 
of the people”
235. In general, while political economy and the science of public finances both 
remain “very unscientific”, Pareto deems the delay to be greater for the latter because it is only 




At any rate, from Pareto’s correspondence some analytical elements emerge of what he means as 
a  scientific  science  of  public  finances.  For  instance,  in  order  to  compare  the  effects  of  an 
extraordinary tax with the effects of an alternative public loan, one must know the present and 
future  effects  that  such  measures  have  on  the  social  and  economic  general  equilibrium. The 
science  of  public  finances  “knows  little”  of  the  latter  and  ignores  the  former
237,  with  the 
consequence that it replaces “real” effects with imaginary effects. The two aforesaid measures 
would produce different effects if at least some taxpayers received a greater or lesser amount as 
interests on the public loan than the amount they have paid as extraordinary tax, or if the sums 




In reality, given that governments never repay the principal and pay the agreed interests only for 
a short time (in real terms), the loan is only one of the many subtle ways of “fleecing part of the 
population  for  the  benefit  of  another  part”.  This  will  be  useful  or  harmful  to  the  country   17 
according to whether or not it takes the country closer to the proportion of social classes, rentiers 





In  order  to  reconstruct,  even  only  partially,  the  thought  of  such  a  multifaceted,  prolific  and 
unsystematic author like Pareto, good philological practice suggests there is a need to take into 
account all of his writings, both public and private. The case study we have conducted seems to 
support this methodological indication. 
 
Indeed,  a  reading  of  Pareto’s  correspondence  gives  us  various  interesting  indications  on  his 
epistemology, which is one of the many topics of his intellectual biography that have not as yet 
been  treated  in  an  altogether  satisfactory  manner.  In  Pareto’s  correspondence  we  find  the 
fundamental  hubs  of  his  conception  of  scientific  knowledge,  such  as  the  purely  relative  and 
phenomenal  character  of  it;  the  double  nature  (both  causal  and  of  interdependence)  of 
phenomenal relationships; the repetitiveness of scientific work and therefore the predictability of 
its  developments;  as  well  as  its  irreversible  incompatibility  with  metaphysics.  According  to 
Pareto, scientific research consists in making use of language as a simple but univocal way of 
labelling the phenomena; of mathematics, as a means to follow lines of reasoning that would be 
too complex to expound verbally; and, above all, of the experimental method, which consists in 
directly  observing  the  phenomena.  Such  research  arrives  at  identifying  uniformities—that  is 
simple  concurrences  of  phenomena  that  make  it  possible,  tautologically,  to  explain  the 
phenomena in the very terms of their accompanying each other. The uniformities are expressed 
through hypothetical and descriptive propositions, and their truth is always provisional and can 
be refuted by reasoning and experimental proof. 
 
It is within such a methodological grid that Pareto’s investigations on economic theory must be 
studied. His correspondence indeed allows one to see his interesting and detailed application of 
his own methodological options to the concept  of final degrees of utility, which he ends up 
accepting  only  provisionally,  since  its  properties  of  being  continuous  and  decreasing  are  the 
object  of  rather  significant  experimental  refutations.  As  the  impossibility  for  utility  to  be 
measured gives pure economy a metaphysical foundation, in line with his own methodology, 
Pareto ends up abandoning that concept for the concept of line of indifference, which, according 
to him, is experimental and finally makes it possible to found a scientific economic theory. 
 
The  role  of  mathematics  in  such  a  theory is  only  justified  by  its  being  indispensable  in  the 
treatment  of  the  GEE  problem,  which  Pareto  chose  as  the  representation  of  the  economic 
phenomenon, because it is the only one that can account for the main characteristic of the latter, 
namely the interdependence of its components. However, the further development of political 
economy  requires  that  the  study  of  economic  phenomena  be  carried  out  by  also  taking  into 
account social phenomena, according to a scientific approach that Pareto is, in his own opinion, 
among the first to cultivate. 
 
By being more a result of the experimental than of the mathematical method, GEE is also the 
discriminating criterion, not only between literary and mathematical theories, but also, within 
these,  between  English  mathematical  economics  (which  in  Pareto’s  opinion  is  heuristically   18 
sterile) and Lausanne mathematical economics. On the other hand, GEE is the only point Pareto 
has  in  common  with  Walras,  from  whom  he  is  epistemologically  poles  apart,  since  his 
predecessor only deals with that which should be, whereas Pareto only studies that which is. 
 
Pareto’s reflection on economic theory appears to be mainly aimed at guiding his study of the 
political phenomenon, in a broad sense, and of the political-economic phenomenon, in a strict 
sense. 
 
Pareto’s correspondence makes it possible to follow down to the most minute detail the 25-year-
long  liberal  and  liberalist  campaign  that  he  conducted,  and  to  note  that  the  reason  for  its 
conclusion is the verification that it is interests and sentiments, and not scientific knowledge, that 
prompt people to action. In that period, Pareto also deeply involves himself in an important 
attempt to renew the theoretical foundations of liberalism, which, anyway, he only sees as the 
least negative economic system for contemporary civilization, and, all things considered, as yet to 
be built. 
 
The related objections that Pareto raises against socialism are founded not on economic theory, 
but on the empirical argument that the statism foreseen by the socialists would lead to such an 
inefficient administration of the economic system that it would cause the death by starvation of 
vast  numbers  of  human  beings.  Pareto  is  favourably  inclined  towards  the  possibility  of  a 
temporary alliance between liberalism and socialism, and against current bourgeois socialism—
that is, against the use the bourgeoisie make of the State in favour of their own interests and to 
the detriment of the interests of the rest of the society. 
 
The altogether limited knowledge one has of the social and economic phenomenon prevents the 
realization of scientific economic policies—of economic policies, that is, which show consistency 
between their goals and means. The considerations one can make on practical economic policies, 
particularly  on  taxation  and  monetary  economic  policies,  can  therefore  only  highlight  the 
aforementioned serious damages that the government more or less knowingly causes to the social 
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